36 incidents and 15 fatalities by the end of July
The overview compiled by the Federal Aviation Safety Committee of the DAeC includes the events from four major areas of general aviation that became known up to 30 July 2026. A total of 36 events were recorded. 15 people lost their lives and 25 were injured.
In at least 21 cases, the aircraft involved was destroyed or suffered a total loss. In addition, there were three incidents in which substantial property damage was caused to third parties.
However, the figures should be viewed in the correct context. This is an ongoing evaluation of events known to the DAeC and not the official final German accident statistics. Individual events are still under investigation. Furthermore, the final causes of accidents have not yet been established in many cases.
Particularly when interpreting potential human factor influences, caution is therefore advised: noticeable patterns can be valuable for prevention work, but they do not replace investigation and root cause analysis by the competent authorities.
Microlight aviation accounts for half of the recorded incidents
Most incidents to date have involved ultralight aviation. Of the total 36 recorded cases, 18 originate from this sector – exactly 50 percent.
Five people were killed and 15 were injured in the process.
In powered flight, nine events were recorded. They claimed five lives and left eight injured. Gliding accounted for six events with two fatalities and five injuries. The motor glider sector recorded the lowest absolute number with three events. However, these were particularly severe: three people lost their lives and two were injured.
The distribution of fatalities therefore also shows that severe accidents are by no means limited to a single category. Five fatalities each were attributable to microlights and powered aircraft, three to motor gliders and two to gliders.
However, it is not possible to deduce from the absolute numbers which sector is actually more dangerous. For this, the number of events would need to be put into proportion with, for example, the number of flight hours, take-offs or active aircraft. Reliable exposure data of this kind is often only available to a limited extent in general aviation.
A series of accidents with very varied outcomes
Behind the statistics lie very different events.
Already at the beginning of April, a fatal accident involving an ultralight aircraft occurred near Barßel-Lohe. A few days later, a serious training accident involving a motor aircraft occurred near Hürtgenwald, in which two people lost their lives.
Further events followed in Coburg-Steinrücken and Hamm, among other places. Later in the year, accidents and incidents were reported from Markdorf, Rheinstetten, Speyer and Hatten/Oldenburg. Several write-offs were also recorded in gliding.
Naturally, events where multiple risk factors coincide or different types of aircraft are involved deserve special attention. An example of this is a collision in the Baden-Baden area involving a powered aircraft and a glider.
Other cases, in turn, show that even events without fatalities can provide important insights. A damaged aircraft after a botched landing or a barely averted loss of control can be at least as instructive for prevention work as a serious accident.
Almost half of all approach and landing accidents
This interim result becomes particularly clear when looking at the flight phases.
Ten of the 36 incidents occurred during the approach, with a further six during the actual landing. This means that these two directly related flight phases alone account for 16 incidents, or around 45 per cent of all recorded cases.
A further six events occurred during takeoff and initial climb. Five cases were attributed to the cruise phase, two to the approach or traffic circuit operations, and two to the descent. Further events were distributed among other phases of flight.
It comes as no surprise that take-off and landing require special attention. During both phases, the aircraft is at a low altitude. The time available to correct errors is short, whilst at the same time the workload in the cockpit increases.
During takeoff, performance calculation, crosswind, obstacles, engine failures and the need for rapid decision-making come together. On the approach, by contrast, speed, flight path, configuration, wind, traffic and available landing distance must be controlled simultaneously.
Therefore, a small error close to the ground can have serious consequences much more quickly than in cruise flight.
The pattern can also be found in European safety data
The DAeC interim report is not alone in this observation. Long-term European security analyses have also been pointing to comparable risk areas for years.
EASA specifically cites loss of control in flight as one of the most significant risks in general aviation. In the case of gliders, collisions and events during takeoff and landing are, alongside losses of control, among the central risk areas. According to European data, landing is even considered a particularly high-risk phase of flight in glider operations.
At the same time, the EASA Annual Safety Review shows that serious accidents in general aviation have by no means disappeared, despite technological advances. For 2024, EASA recorded 27 fatal accidents involving non-complex aircraft and 44 fatalities across Europe. In addition, there were ten fatal accidents involving gliders, resulting in twelve deaths.
European long-term data thus supports the general direction of the German interim report: advances in technology, navigation and weather information do not eliminate the classic risks of private aviation.
Loss of control remains one of the greatest risks
Particular attention should be paid to the so-called loss of control in-flight, or LOC-I for short.
This refers to a state in which an aircraft deviates from its intended attitude or flight path and the pilot is unable to regain control, or cannot do so in time. Typical starting points can include a stall, excessively low speed, an incorrect attitude, poor energy management, turbulence, icing, or inadvertent entry into meteorological conditions for which the pilot or aircraft are not prepared.
Loss of control at low altitude is considered particularly critical. Whilst at high altitude there may still be time for recovery, a stall or spin after takeoff or during a tight circuit turn can become irreversible within a few seconds.
EASA identifies LOC-I as a particularly significant and fatal accident risk in general aviation and explicitly points out that take-off and landing represent especially critical phases.
For training, this means that stall recognition and avoidance should not merely be exercises for examinations or proficiency checks. What is crucial is the understanding of how an aircraft approaches a critical energy state under real-world conditions – for example during a go-around, following an engine failure, in a steep circuit turn, or when distracted on final approach.
Human Factors as a recurring theme
The DAeC evaluation places a special emphasis on human factors. In numerous incidents, human influencing factors can be identified based on the analysis so far.
These include, among other things, poor decisions, loss of control close to the ground, inadequate airspace monitoring, misjudgements of weather conditions, problems during emergency landings and an overestimation of one's own abilities.
In this context, human factors must not be equated with „pilot error“.
Modern safety management is currently trying to move away from such a simplified view. An accident often arises from a chain of different factors. Weather, time pressure, experience, level of training, technical specifics, expectations, stress and external influences can together create a situation in which an initially small poor decision suddenly has significant consequences.
It is precisely for this reason that it makes more sense to ask why a decision seemed plausible in the specific situation, rather than merely stating that it was wrong in hindsight.
Plan Continuation Bias: When the goal becomes more important than the situation
A particularly relevant pattern is sticking to a once-made plan.
The pilot wants to go home. Passengers are waiting. The aircraft must go back to the lessor. There is an appointment scheduled for the next morning. The weather is a bit worse than expected, but the flight is already well underway.
Each individual piece of this information may seem harmless. Together, however, they can lead to alternatives being increasingly sidelined.
This is precisely where the concept of plan continuation bias comes in. The more time, effort and personal expectation have already been invested in a plan, the harder it can become to abandon it.
Good airmanship therefore doesn't just mean planning a flight carefully. It equally means being able to discard one's own plan at any time.
A turnaround, stopover or flight cancellation is not a failed mission, but can be the most professional decision of the entire flight.
Airspace surveillance remains crucial despite modern technology
Collision risks are also among the topics covered in the interim review.
Electronic collision warning systems, ADS-B, FLARM and other technologies can significantly improve traffic detection. However, they do not replace visual lookout.
This applies particularly in the vicinity of airfields, in traffic circuits, during glider operations and in areas with heavy mixed traffic.
The challenge lies in correctly integrating electronic information into the scan. Anyone who constantly stares at a display to look for traffic that they should actually be spotting outside the cockpit can partially lose the safety gain.
Also at a European level, the risk of collisions is one of the important issues in general aviation. In the case of gliders, EASA explicitly lists airborne collision among the most significant safety risks.
Pilots aged between 51 and 70 particularly common
The age distribution of the participating pilots is also interesting.
Around 59 percent of the recorded events relate to the age groups between 51 and 70 years. The largest single share is accounted for by the 51-to-60 age group, followed by the 61-to-70-year-olds.
However, these figures must not be interpreted as evidence that older pilots generally have a higher risk of accidents.
For that, it would need to be known how the total flight hours are distributed among the various age groups. If, for example, a particularly large number of active private pilots are between 50 and 70 years old, or if they fly an above-average number of hours, a correspondingly high share of the incidents would also be expected.
The figures therefore initially provide a description, but no explanation.
More interesting is another finding: experience alone does not prevent accidents. Even pilots with many flight hours can fall into expectation traps, develop routines or misjudge their own limits.
Experience requires regular training
Particularly in private aviation, this creates a structural problem. A pilot may have held a licence for decades, yet not have practised certain situations for years.
The total number of flying hours, for example, says little about when a realistic engine failure, go-around, stall recovery, crosswind landing or landing on a short runway was last practised.
For this reason, refresher training courses can be beneficial even beyond the statutory minimum requirements.
A flight with a flight instructor does not have to be an exam. On the contrary, it offers the opportunity to specifically practise situations that a pilot would understandably prefer to avoid during normal flight operations.
DAeC is placing greater emphasis on human factors
Against this background, the DAeC has established a Human Factors core team. The approach is not to view flight safety solely as a technical or regulatory task.
The focus is on the human being as part of the overall system.
Accident and incident patterns are to be evaluated, findings prepared in a comprehensible manner and concrete recommendations developed from them for pilots, flight instructors, clubs and associations.
This includes topics such as decision-making, situational awareness, risk perception, self-management, communication and safety culture.
A cross-disciplinary approach is particularly important here. The 2026 interim review shows that similar mechanisms can be found in very different fields – in ultralight flying as well as in powered flight, gliding and motor gliding.
Five key priorities for flight safety work
Based on the previous analysis, the Federal Aviation Safety Board derives several fields of action.
The top priority is to improve take-off and landing techniques. This encompasses not only the actual piloting skills, but also stable approaches, consistent go-around decisions, crosswind training, energy management and preparation for malfunctions immediately after take-off.
A second priority is more intensive human factors training. Decision-making errors rarely arise from a lack of theoretical knowledge. Therefore, training should place greater emphasis on real-life decision-making situations, time pressure, and changing conditions.
Added to this are a realistic perception of risk, as well as improved airspace monitoring and collision avoidance.
Finally, regular refresher training and safety briefings should help to integrate lessons learned from actual events into flight operations more quickly.
Not only using accidents, but also near misses
However, an effective safety culture must not focus exclusively on accidents.
For every serious accident there are numerous situations that nearly led to one: the approach broken off too late, the surprisingly tight fuel reserve, the overlooked traffic, the unintentional approach to a stall, or the weather decision that only just turned out all right.
It is precisely these events that are of great value for prevention.
However, a prerequisite is a culture in which pilots can speak openly about this without immediately having to fear personal blame. Clubs and flight schools can make an important contribution to this by establishing safety briefings and systematically sharing experiences.
What the figures do not show
With all the attention that 15 fatalities within a few months understandably generate, the statistics should not be overinterpreted.
From 36 events, for example, it cannot be deduced that general aviation has fundamentally become less safe in 2026 than in previous years. Complete annual data and, above all, reference figures such as flight hours or flight movements would be required for this.
Nor does the fact that 50 per cent of the recorded incidents involve ultralight aircraft, in itself, prove that this class of aircraft carries a higher individual risk of accidents.
And finally, a recognisable human factors aspect is not automatically the definitive cause of the accident.
The interim review is therefore above all what it is supposed to be: an instrument to identify patterns early on and concentrate prevention measures where they promise the greatest benefit.
Conclusion: Drawing concrete consequences from 36 events
Despite all its statistical limitations, the DAeC’s interim report for 2026 sends a clear message. Many of the known incidents are concentrated in the most demanding phases of flight: take-off, approach and landing. At the same time, familiar risk patterns such as loss of control, misjudgements, failure to monitor airspace and problematic decision-making processes recur time and again.
This largely aligns in key areas with the long-term findings of European aviation safety work. The EASA also continues to see significant risks in general aviation from loss of control and events surrounding takeoff and landing.
The decisive consequence of this is no longer regulation for its own sake. Much can already be achieved through rigorous training, realistic personal limits, better decision-making processes and an open safety culture.
The 36 incidents recorded to date should therefore not be viewed merely as accident statistics. Behind every single case lies an opportunity to learn. This is precisely where the real value of such an interim review lies: in using the lessons learnt from past incidents to ensure, as far as possible, that similar accidents do not happen again in the future.
Source references:
DAEC
