Why GA continues to have too many accidents
GA covers all civil flights outside of scheduled airline and commercial charter services - from training flights to photo flights and private cross-country flights. Compared to commercial aviation, its risk level remains high. The analysis of the 46 studies shows a consistent pattern: the most important cause clusters can be assigned to five subject areas - with clear overlaps between people, training and the environment.
Five topics that drive accidents
1. human factors
The studies summarise decision-making and perception errors, situational overload, fatigue, distraction, inadequate preparation and physiological influences under "human factors". It becomes critical when visual references are lost: In IMC or at night, the fatal risk increases dramatically, especially for VFR pilots without instrument authorisation. The combination of time pressure, deteriorating weather conditions and dwindling avoidance options favours spatial disorientation - a classic path to loss of control.
2. deficits in training
Many accidents are not caused by "not being able to", but by "not being able to". Rarely practised manoeuvres (emergency procedures, unusual attitudes, approach stabilisation in crosswinds, go-arounds) erode quickly. The studies show: Formal "currency" is not enough; demonstrable proficiency is crucial. Recurrent training with instructors, systematic simulator practice and structured refresher courses close precisely these gaps - both technical and non-technical (communication, crew resources in single-pilot operations, decision-making discipline).
3. aircraft characteristics
The accident patterns differ between single-engine and twin-engine types. In the twin class, events following engine failure continue to occur when single-engine procedures are not flown cleanly. The age of the GA fleet is high; however, well-maintained older aircraft do not show a fundamentally higher failure rate than newer ones - the quality of maintenance is the decisive factor. Modern avionics (EFIS, TAWS, Traffic, EGPWS-Light, ADS-B-In/Out) and auxiliary systems such as AoA indicators or rescue parachute systems measurably improve safety margins - provided that pilots are trained in their use.
4. pilot-related characteristics
Experience has an ambivalent effect: fewer hours correlate with more operating and decision-making errors; a very high level of experience does not automatically protect against rule violations or routine traps. A significant predictor is the individual safety culture: those who analyse incidents openly, use mentoring and consciously deal with "external pressures" noticeably reduce their personal risk. Previous accidents and offences are a warning signal - targeted follow-up training helps here.
5th flight phase
The danger is concentrated at the edges of the flight profile: take-off, circuit, approach/landing and manoeuvres close to the ground have a low margin of error. Common patterns are stall/spin after an unstable approach, late take-off, directional and energy management errors as well as CFIT events in complex terrain or in poor visibility. In the cruise phase, the severity of accidents increases due to higher energies when weather, icing or terrain are added.
What can be deduced from current data and programmes
Europe and the USA address the main patterns with consistent safety programmes. In Europe, "loss of control in flight" remains the dominant fatal accident pattern in GA, while the absolute number of GA fatalities has barely fallen for years. In the USA, trends are made transparent in rolling reports and dashboards; at the same time, the FAA is focusing on measurable proficiency with programmes such as WINGS instead of pure "check-off actuality". GA roadmaps, safety promotion campaigns for VFR-into-IMC and standardised UPRT requirements in training are moving in the same direction worldwide: prevention through competence building and better decision-making quality.
Practical prevention - what has been proven to work
Structured decisions instead of gut feeling
A consistent decision-making framework helps before and during the flight: PAVE for risk assessment, 3P/DECIDE for action selection, 5P for regular reassessment. In addition, IMSAFE creates commitment in self-assessment. If you use these models consistently, you can break chains of decision-making errors at an early stage.
Recurrent training with a system
An effective annual programme combines three elements: guided flying with CFI (emergency procedures, crosswind landings, go-around decisions, energy and flight path management), realistic simulator scenarios (VFR-into-IMC, unstable approach, NAV failure, icing) and targeted theory refreshers on weather, performance and human factors. Add-ons with clear evidence: UPRT, regular basic instrument training for VFR pilots and check flights focussing on decision quality instead of just manual work.
Using technology correctly
Glass cockpit, traffic and terrain data are only a safety benefit if workload management and automation discipline are in place. It makes sense to retrofit AoA indicators for stall prevention and - depending on the type - rescue systems. Equally important: consistent use of ADS-B data for your own debriefing ("flight debriefing"). Clubs can derive collective trends from real flight data, e.g. stable approach rates, go-around frequency, energy profiles in the final or typical "late go-around" decisions.
Weather, terrain, night - consciously planning with margins
Personal minima above the legal values, real alternatives and "Plan B" before take-off are mandatory. The following applies near mountainous terrain: take glide range planning, wind shear and lee waves into account; night flying only with clear visual references, a clean emergency strategy and stabilised procedures.
Organisation and culture
Clubs and operators benefit from safety briefings, anonymous reporting systems, standardised SOPs and checklists - and a culture that protects go/no-go decisions. Those who analyse incidents without apportioning blame learn more quickly and prevent recurrences.
Specific recommendations for the next 90 days
- Define personal minima in writing and keep them in the cockpit.
- Plan a recurrent block: 2-3 flights with CFI plus two realistic simulator sessions (IMC entry, unusual positions, go-around matrix).
- Analyse your own last approach as a video or data debrief (stability criteria, energy management, go-around trigger).
- Refresh your weather skills: practical briefing scheme, local pitfalls, icing and thunderstorm tactics.
- Avionics training "in the dry": FMS/GPS procedures, direct-to-discipline, automation traps; if retrofitted, have AoA indicator/traffic systematically briefed.
- Establish an anonymous feedback format within the club and discuss typical events (e.g. long hover-outs, unstable approaches).
- For VFR pilots: Repeat basic instrument insertions and escape procedures; for IR pilots: Take currency in real terms, not just formally.
Research gaps and next steps
The meta-analysis makes it clear that we know a lot about accident patterns, but too little about how skills can be maintained in the long term. Studies on VR/AR-supported training, data-supported club safety management (e.g. ADS-B-based stability metrics) and the effectiveness of combined programmes of technology, training and decision-making discipline would be useful here. Mental health in GA is equally underexposed - a field with great practical safety relevance.
Conclusion
GA becomes measurably safer when three things come together: stringent decision-making models in everyday life, regular, scenario-based training and cleverly utilised technology. The way to achieve this is no secret - it requires consistency, culture and a willingness to prioritise learning over pride.
Source references:
ScienceDirect