On the day of the accident, the 50-year-old pilot in charge took off together with another pilot from Sch\u00e4rding\/Suben (LOLS) to Salzburg (LOWS). Two passengers boarded there - the destination was a flight to Zagreb (LDZA). According to investigators, this first flight was already affected by a Overloading<\/strong> and a centre of gravity outside the tolerance<\/strong> both violations of the basic principles of aircraft control and flight safety.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the afternoon, the Cirrus took off on its return flight from Zagreb to Salzburg. according to visual flight rules (VFR)<\/strong>although the meteorological conditions are clearly Instrument flight conditions (IMC)<\/strong> could be expected. The pilot did not have an IFR authorisation. At the time of the accident, there was an active foehn wind from the south over the Alps and an approaching cold front with low cloud bases and possible icing. Despite this, the aircraft climbed 11,500 feet<\/strong> - an altitude at which, according to EASA regulations, after 30 minutes at the latest Oxygen<\/strong> must be supplied. No evidence of a corresponding system on board was found.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After about an hour in the air, the pilot reported to Wien Information at 8,800 feet - that was the last radio contact. The Cirrus soon lost altitude and was observed by eyewitnesses as it crashed out of the clouds with a loud engine noise, a sharp bank angle and low speed. The aircraft crashed in a wooded area at an altitude of 1,250 metres. The Propeller drilled 1.5 metres deep into the ground<\/strong>The cell was completely destroyed. There were no survivors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Austrian Federal Safety Investigation Board (SUB) analysed the wreckage. Technical defects were ruled out - at the time of the accident, the aircraft was in a perfect technical condition<\/strong>. The cause was therefore not in the material, but in the human being<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The list of omissions is long:<\/p>\n\n\n\n This combination led to a catastrophic loss of attitude control - and demonstrated impressively that regulations in aviation are not formalities, but Safety barriers<\/strong> are.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Cirrus SR20 was equipped with the well-known Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS)<\/strong> a complete rescue system capable of bringing the entire aircraft and its occupants safely to the ground on a parachute. It was Not triggered<\/strong>because the safety pin on the release handle had not been removed. According to SUB, the system could have prevented the crash if it had been released in time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This detail raises further safety issues - especially for emergency services. The rescue system that had not been triggered posed a danger<\/strong>The contained rocket could have been ignited unintentionally at any time. As the fire brigade did not have the necessary expertise or tools on site, the Demining service of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior<\/strong> had to be called in. It took six hours to defuse the system and rescue the victims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As a consequence, the Safety Investigation Board is demanding three key measures from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA):<\/p>\n\n\n\n These requirements apply not only to Cirrus aircraft, but also to many microlight aircraft, in which rescue systems are widely used - although their operation is subject to national regulations. EASA is therefore required to develop a Coordinated European approach<\/strong> to create.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The crash of the Cirrus SR20 tragically reveals how Wrong decisions, rule violations and ignorance<\/strong> can interact fatally. No single factor alone was the cause - but the chain of many avoidable mistakes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These range from inadequate flight preparation, disregard of meteorological warnings, inadequate technical instruction in safety equipment to ignoring the basic regulations for weight, centre of gravity and equipment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The incident emphasises the need for this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The accident in Tamsweg is an example of human error in series - but it is precisely cases like this that can be analysed in detail. Save future lives<\/strong>. The proposals formulated by the SUB to the EASA are Practicable, urgent and safety-relevant<\/strong>. They show that aviation safety does not end with airworthiness - but begins with training, planning and a sense of responsibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe last sign of life - and the crash<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThe causes: A chain of serious mistakes<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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\n\n\n\nThe role of the overall rescue system - and new safety requirements<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nThree specific recommendations to the EASA<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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This is intended to provide emergency services with rapid access to security-relevant information during operations - especially for defusing such systems.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
Similar to flight data recorders, the hazardous components should be clearly identifiable by means of striking colours.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
There is currently only a safety catch on the release handle in the cockpit - an additional safety catch on the engine itself could make the work of rescue teams considerably safer.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nLessons learnt from the accident: training, responsibility, prevention<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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\n\n\n\nConclusion: Tragic lesson with potential for improvement<\/h3>\n\n\n\n